Question put, hat the amendment be made.
The Committee divided:
Ayes 9, Noes 10.

Greg Hands: I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. We might be going too far down this road. I do not want to sound in any way condescending to a new Member, and my only advice to him, having been a Member in this House for 12 years, would be that the receipt of 5,000 emails from 650 constituencies is an average of nine emails per constituency. If he is suggesting that we make public policy, and that each of us makes our policy decisions, based on the opinions of nine constituents, I do not believe that would be a helpful road for us to go down.
Returning to the GPA, the UK’s independent membership will be considered under the CRAG process, meaning Parliament will be able to scrutinise the terms of the UK joining the GPA before the GPA can join in the debate, as I referred to on Thursday. The Government therefore believe that the negative resolution procedure provides an appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny for the power to implement the GPA in clause 1.
Furthermore, the Opposition amendment would also apply the affirmative resolution procedure when the UK uses clause 1 to make regulations to reflect new parties joining the GPA or—this is a very important point—existing parties withdrawing from it. In the case of new and withdrawing parties, it is important that the UK is able to respond quickly and flexibly. Once a new party deposits its instrument of accession, there is a period of only 30 days before that accession comes into force. The UK will then be under an immediate obligation to provide that new party with guaranteed access to UK procurement opportunities covered by the GPA. If the UK failed to offer the new party this guaranteed access, it would be in breach of its GPA commitment. On the other hand, a party to the GPA can decide to withdraw unilaterally, and where a party notifies the GPA committee that they intend to withdraw, they will cease to be a GPA member just 60 days later. Therefore, it is vital we are able to react quickly to such a notification.
If the power to amend UK legislation to reflect parties withdrawing from the GPA were subject to any affirmative procedure, the UK might not be able to legislate in time to remove the party by the 60-day time limit, which, of course, could result in the UK contracting authorities continuing to give guaranteed access to UK markets to a party that is leaving or had already left the GPA, and was therefore no longer entitled to access.

Barry Gardiner: Let me state for the record that I am grateful to you, Mr Davies, and to the Clerks for agreeing to the reordering that we requested, so that amendments 14 and 15 could be selected with amendment 16, and debated ahead of amendments 17 and 19. I will try to make it clear why that is necessary.
I touched on the central problem of the Bill in my opening remarks in Committee when we first began our line-by-line examination of it. The Bill provides for the Government to issue regulations that will implement the UK’s new trade agreements with countries that currently have a trade agreement with the EU. The new UK trade agreement need bear no resemblance whatever to the EU agreement that it replaces; the Bill contains nothing requiring the UK agreement to match or mirror the EU’s existing agreement in any way, shape or form. It can be a wholly new departure with wholly new obligations. All the Bill requires is that the other signatory and the European Union were signatories to a trade agreement before Brexit took effect.
As we know from our witness sessions, there is every possibility that our trading partners will seek to use the negotiations on a new agreement with the UK to reopen any areas where they were unhappy with the outcome of their negotiations with the European Union. That is precisely what South Africa’s Trade Minister, Rob Davies, confirmed last year when he said that South Africa would be looking to expand the agricultural trade quotas and revisit the sanitary and phytosanitary measures that were negotiated as part of the EU’s economic partnership agreement with the Southern African Development Community.
Nor will the new UK agreement have undergone any process of scrutiny akin to the process that currently pertains, in which both the EU and our European Scrutiny Committee examine and debate trade agreements as they are being negotiated, as well as when they are being prepared for signing and ratification. Instead, the Government must simply lay the text of any new agreement before Parliament for 21 sitting days, as we have discussed extensively.
Using the power granted by the Bill, the Government can issue implementing regulations by means of the negative procedure, effectively removing Parliament from the process. That is why the Library briefing, which I cited earlier, is undeniably correct in stating bluntly that the Bill
“seeks to minimise Parliament’s role”.
Rather than repeating what I said, I will quote the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve); he asked the Secretary of State for International Trade:
“does the delegated powers memorandum not make it absolutely clear that the powers are broad enough to enable not just the implementation of these agreements, but their substantial amendment, including the creation of new obligations? Does that not then make it sensible—I urge him to do this—for the Government to look, as the Bill progresses, at ways to ensure that those can be properly scrutinised? That is because the methods we currently have of the European Scrutiny Committee and the European Parliament will no longer exist. That is a relevant issue for this House, and if the Government were to look at it in a sensible light, the Bill would be improved.”—[Official Report, 9 January 2018; Vol. 634, c. 218.]
I could not have put it better. The right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield is absolutely right. This is the moment for the Government to look at the issue in the sensible light that he proposed, and to make those necessary improvements to the Bill.
Schedule 2(2) is where the issue comes to a head, as it deals with parliamentary scrutiny of regulations that will implement the new UK trade agreements designed to replace those we have by virtue of being in the EU. Our amendment 15, the substantive amendment in this group, speaks directly to our desire to ensure that Parliament can subject the new free trade agreements to proper scrutiny.
I point out again that amendment 15 speaks to the UK’s new free trade agreements—the significant, comprehensive trade agreements that are notifiable under the article XXIV of the general agreement on tariffs and trade and article V of the general agreement on trade in services. It does not suggest that we need to adopt such a process in respect of the other trade agreements that remain undefined in the Bill, namely mutual recognition agreements and the like. We are concerned with major free trade agreements that could have lasting social and economic impacts—precisely the type of treaty that has aroused public anger and resistance to the free trade agenda over the past few years.
Amendment 15 introduces a super-affirmative procedure to the process prior to ratification. This is the only procedure available to Parliament that ensures a proper level of scrutiny, guaranteeing both Houses of Parliament a vote on whether to approve the ratification of a new treaty. It provides for a Committee of either House to recommend rejection of the treaty; that goes some way towards replacing the lost powers of the European Scrutiny Committee. As per normal parliamentary custom, the precise function of such a Committee would be detailed in the Standing Orders.
We have deliberately constructed this amendment in such a way that the process applies prior to ratification. It would require the Government to lay before Parliament a draft order under which the trade agreement in question would be ratified. During the period covered by the Bill’s sunset clause, any UK free trade agreements that met the criteria of clause 2(3) would go through this process, rather than through CRAGA.
Once the new UK trade agreement has undergone this process of enhanced scrutiny, it will be possible to relax the level of scrutiny for the regulations needed to implement the trade agreement, as the treaty itself will have been through sufficient scrutiny prior to its ratification. This is why we needed to reorder the groups of amendments so as to take amendment 15 before amendment 19. If amendment 15 is voted through, we will not need amendment 19, as the scrutiny will already have taken place prior to ratification.
If, on the other hand, the Government vote down amendment 15, we will have failed to introduce a proper process of scrutiny prior to ratification. In that instance, trade agreements will have been ratified with a minimum of parliamentary involvement. We will therefore need to rely on scrutiny of the implementing regulations. We would then press to a vote amendment 19, which provides for the super-affirmative procedure.

Greg Hands: Let me reassure hon. Members that I listened very carefully to what the hon. Member for Brent North said. First, let me repeat that the majority of free trade agreements within the scope of the Bill have already been ratified, and Parliament had the opportunity to scrutinise them during ratification. Parliament’s European Scrutiny Committee also scrutinised these agreements when they were negotiated, included, signed and provisionally applied. They had, of course, already gone through the European Parliament process as well, to which the hon. Member for Warrington South helpfully drew our attention.
The Government have made clear their intention to ratify by exit date all the EU free trade agreements that currently provisionally apply, including the EU-Canada comprehensive economic and trade agreement agreement, and the economic partnership agreement with the Southern African Development Community, or SADC.
The hon. Member for Brent North drew attention to the comments of a South African Minister. To be honest, I cannot remember precisely whom he referred to, but for clarity I refer him to the memorandum of understanding signed by the Secretary of State for International Trade in South Africa in either August or September. Both parties specifically agreed to transition the agreement and maintain continuity, without substantive change. Whatever the hon. Gentleman’s South African said, the memorandum of understanding is absolutely clear in that regard. As I said to the International Trade Committee last week, 70-plus countries have agreed in principle to maintain continuity in trading arrangements. For example, we signed a similar memorandum with the CARIFORUM group to do precisely that.
Parliament’s scrutiny of these agreements, which have already been scrutinised, will be guaranteed by the process under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. As we have made clear, this is a technical exercise to secure continuity in our existing trading arrangements, not an opportunity to renegotiate the terms of existing agreements. That means that further scrutiny of those agreements, the benefits of which are already felt by businesses and consumers, is unnecessary. As we have made clear, we want Parliament to play a vital role in the scrutiny of future trade agreements that are not covered by the Bill, but that is for a separate occasion. We made clear in the trade White Paper and in this Committee on Thursday that our future trade policy must be transparent and inclusive.

Barry Gardiner: Amendment 19 would require any regulations implementing new UK trade agreements to be subject to a super-affirmative procedure. If the Government are not willing to allow us the super-affirmative procedure prior to ratification, as they have just shown they are not, we will be compelled to argue for it  afterwards. Clearly, we would prefer to keep the stable door shut rather than having to retrieve the horse after it has bolted, but if we could at least provide for some parliamentary process subjecting implementing regulations to scrutiny, that would be better than nothing. As it is presently constituted, nothing is precisely what the Bill offers.
The procedure mirrors that which we seek to introduce with amendment 15: namely, in this case, a proper process granting Parliament the power to subject implementing regulations to scrutiny. The provisions are drawn from existing primary legislation that provides for enhanced scrutiny in other contexts. Once again, the key elements of them are that a Committee of either House can object to the regulations, and that both Houses must give their approval before the Secretary of State can proceed with making the regulations.
Amendment 17 is, in a sense, our fall-back position should amendment 19 not succeed. I cannot believe that the Government will risk the ire of right hon. and hon. Members from the Conservative party as well as the Opposition parties by turning down every single attempt to introduce scrutiny provisions to the Bill. We would have preferred something altogether more rigorous than just intervening at the late stage of implementing regulations, but if that is all that the Minister is prepared to leave us with, we will have to satisfy ourselves with that meagre pottage. In the relevant Delegated Legislation Committee we would then able to have a debate and vote when the implementing regulations were submitted.

Matt Western: Just to clarify—the Minister can correct me if I am wrong—the agreements will in many cases trilateral because of our existing relationship with the EU and the relationship with the other country among the 70-plus the Minister mentioned. There is therefore an opportunity for that other country to make the negotiation or arrangement difficult. That is why we are seeking to put in place scrutiny in Parliament.

Bill Esterson: I think we should press on. The Minister has enough to worry about.
As Mr Stevenson of the Manufacturing Trade Remedies Alliance told us last week:
“Some see trade remedies as purely protectionist and would abolish them completely”.––[Official Report, Trade Public Bill Committee, 23 January 2018; c. 65, Q124.]
It is key, therefore, that Parliament, through its relevant Committee, should get to scrutinise who the Secretary of State appoints as the head of the relevant body, and that it should make sure it is someone with the competence, experience and disposition to stand up for the best interests of British industries and the British people.
Similarly, amendment 22 would ensure that the Secretary of State cannot appoint non-executive members to the TRA at his whim and fancy. He should not be able to stack the TRA with members of a certain political and ideological persuasion that would mean they would be less likely to act on complaints brought forward and less likely to recommend measures. We heard from Mr Stevenson of the MTRA last week that if all its members
“thought trade remedies were protectionist, we would never get any trade remedies through”. ”.––[Official Report, Trade Public Bill Committee, 23 January 2018; c. 65, Q124.]
Parliamentary scrutiny of the membership of the TRA is even more important in the light of the evidence given to this committee by Mr Tom Reynolds of the British Ceramic Confederation. He highlighted to us at column 67 that, within the context of our membership of the European Union, the UK Government took on the role of the “liberal counterweight” opposing strong trade defence measures. However, now that we will not have the other 27 member states, of which a majority is for trade remedies, we cannot afford to take the same approach.
Unfortunately, according to Mr Reynolds, UK civil servants and experts are “steeped in that heritage” of the UK being a neo-liberal counterweight. We cannot afford to let that institutional memory dictate how our independent trade defence policy is conducted. We need to ensure that the non-executive board of the TRA is a watchdog that ensures balance in the system. The only way to do that is to allow this House, through the appropriate Committee, to have a say on the appointment of the board members.
Finally and most importantly, amendment 23 would ensure that the TRA includes among its non-executive members representatives of stakeholder bodies potentially  affected by the recommendations of the TRA. Those stakeholders are the producers, the trade unions representing the workers and a representative of each of the devolved Administrations. We have put that into our amendment because we believe that the key stakeholders affected by unfair trading practices should be represented around the table where decisions are being made that affect the survival of their industries and jobs, and the wellbeing of their communities. The TRA will only be enriched by experts from industry, trade unions and the devolved Administrations, who are the ones facing the realities of dumping on a day-to-day basis and close to home.

Hannah Bardell: It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once again, Mr Davies. It has been a fascinating debate. I want to say at the outset that we absolutely support our colleagues in the Labour party in their amendments, but have also tabled amendments 39, 38, 40 and 41, which I will speak to.
The legislation needs to be strengthened. Amnesty’s response was interesting. It said that an independent body with appropriate expertise should be established with a remit to conduct or commission assessment impacts of future free trade agreements on human rights, equality and the environment in the UK and of  trading partners. This could be the proposed Trade Remedies Authority if it were given the resources, remit and powers.
On powers, it is important to remember that we are 20 years on from devolution. Devolution delivered huge changes across the nations of the UK. I can understand that many in England perhaps feel somewhat left behind, because we have moved on in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. I have some sympathy with that but the point of the amendments is respecting devolution, and recognising the nations of the UK and the relationship that they have developed directly with the EU, and the importance of trade.
The Scottish Parliament was established to be accountable and answerable to the people of Scotland, to be open and encourage participation, to be accessible and to involve all the people of Scotland in its decisions as much as possible, and to have power sharing. That is an important point: power should be shared among the Scottish Government, the Scottish Parliament and the people of Scotland.
On the decisions about where the trade remedies authority is physically located and about whether it will have non-exec members, decisions about the businesses and the people of each of the nations of the UK are best made as close to those people as possible. We understand that the functions of the trade remedies authority will be reserved and it will undertake trade remedies investigations across the UK, but it is important that Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland Ministers have a role in the Trade Remedies Authority.
Amendment 39 requires the Secretary of State to secure the consent of each of the devolved nations before appointing a chair to the Trade Remedies Authority. We feel it is only fair that we have a say in that matter. It is common practice for interview panels to be made up of people from a range of disciplines. The hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford said that there will be a range of people, but I am sure he will have sympathy with my view that, although the west midlands is a very important part of the UK, it is not a country in the way that Scotland is. Since 2007, Scottish exports to the EU have grown by more than 25%. The EU market is eight times larger than the UK’s alone. Scotland exported £12.3 billion-worth of exports to the EU in 2015, and that figure is growing, so the EU is a hugely important market for us. It stands to reason that Wales and Northern Ireland must have a fair and proper say in who is appointed.
I sat on the Enterprise Bill Committee in 2016 when the Small Business Commissioner was created, and I thought that was an excellent idea. It was great to see ideas being taken from Australia. Forgive me for going slightly off topic for a second, Mr Davies, but at the time, the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills made a lot of the fact that the Small Business Commissioner was based on the Australian model. I went to Australia and met the small business commissioner of Victoria and New South Wales. In Australia, there is an overall federal commissioner, individual state commissioners, and individual offices in each area of the country. In contrast, we have only one commissioner. It strikes me that this Bill mirrors that approach, in that the Trade Remedies Authority is centralised. That is my concern.
We genuinely want to ensure that the nations of the UK have a fair and proper say, which is why amendment 40 would require the Secretary of State to secure each devolved authority’s consent before removing the chief executive of the Trade Remedies Authority from office. In practice, having non-exec members on the TRA means that representation and influence from each of the devolved nations will be built into the authority. I am sure it is not beyond the wit of any authority, when it sets up a process, to establish consent through fair and proper human resources processes. It is interesting that Jude Kirton-Darling MEP said in evidence:
“There is a clear role for stronger scrutiny. Inside the legislation, there is no obligation on the Secretary of State or the new Trade Remedies Authority to engage directly with Parliament through, for example, a specific Committee of Parliament.”––[Official Report, Trade Public Bill Committee, 23 January 2018; c. 45, Q88.]
I understand that this is uncharted territory for Parliament, but it would do us good, in terms of our international reputation and how we interact with business and stakeholders, to be seen to be agile, flexible and able to change our procedures to deal with whatever comes down the line. I do not want Brexit to happen. I do not want the UK or Scotland to leave the EU, and Scotland did not vote to leave it, but in this Bill we must take on board points made by not just parliamentarians and politicians, but businesses.
Amendment 41 would require the Trade Remedies Authority to maintain offices in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and require those offices to play a key role in ensuring that the views and needs of the devolved Administrations were safeguarded in the authority’s day-to-day-running. Establishing the UK Green Investment Bank in Edinburgh was, in fairness to the Conservative Government, a positive move. Lots of things have happened since then—things have changed somewhat—but the fact that it was established in Edinburgh and that there was cross-party consensus was positive. Why do the Government not take forward that good work and consider accepting our amendment?
Going back to my earlier point, ensuring that the decisions are made in the devolved nations would be recognition of the distinct nature of the nations of the UK and the differences in the way they do business with each other, with Europe and with the rest of the world. We all know that the Scotland Act 1998 was very careful to state that everything that is not expressly reserved is devolved. It is really important that we take that on board.